Phun With Philosophy: Freedom
>> 20 November 2008
When I tell people that I am studying philosophy, they invariably ask me the same question: "What do you want to do with that?" Followed by this astute observation: "I can't think of many jobs that pay you to just sit around and philosophize." I usually hem and haw a little bit and give some sort of self-deprecating answer. But not any more. The next time someone asks me, "what can you do with a degree in philosophy?" I will answer proudly...Write about it on my e-blog! So, with that said, welcome to the first installment of Fun with Philosophy!
The question of whether individual freedom exists is a classic in metaphysics. But what does it mean to be free? Consider this example:
Dirk, a brilliant neurologist, decides to do a little experiment on his room-mate Tom in which Tom plays solitaire without stopping until he wins a game. Dirk has installed a device in Tom's brain which, if Tom at any point stops playing solitaire, can be triggered to hijack Tom's brain and force him to keep playing solitaire. If Tom stops playing, Dirk will use the device to make Tom play.So, they run the experiment, and, as it turns out, Tom loves solitaire and plays it enthusiastically for twenty minutes before he wins a game and the experiment ends. Dirk doesn't have to use the device because Tom didn't stop playing. Tom wanted to play and so he did.
Now, the questions is: Was Tom's playing solitaire an action which he did freely? On one hand, it seems like it was a free action because Tom was doing exactly what he wanted to do. But on the other hand, it seems like his action was not free because he could not have done otherwise. If he had tried to stop playing solitaire, Dirk would have triggered the device and hijacked Tom's brain, forcing him to keep playing. Does freedom mean being able to do the specific things which we choose to do? Or does it mean being able to do anything which is physically possible?
What do you think? Was Tom's action free or not?
6 comments:
We talked about this issue recently in my Phi 301 class, and I found it very intriguing.
Also, your example is confusing, because it involved hijacking someone's brain and changing their thinking patterns, so I don't know what I think. If someone is controlling your brain, then it seems like they could control your will power, or agency, and that therefore you're not free.
In class, we talked about an example where a man is in a room with a locked door but he doesn't realize the door is locked. He decides not to leave the room, and he doesn't try the lock on the door. Is he free in his decision to stay inside the room? In this example, I say yes.
This seems like a problem of definition, rather than substance, as the answer to the question "Was Tom's action free?" varies entirely based on the definition of "freedom" applied.
Based on current understanding of causality in quantum mechanics, it's pretty certain that if we apply the second definition, that our freedom or agency is entirely illusionary. The first definition is a more plausible scenario.
The definition is the substance! Does 'freedom' mean 'the ability to act without constraint' or does it simply mean 'the ability to act according to one's desires, though the actions may be constrained.'
The answer has pretty serious metaphysical implications. The first definition is inconsistent with general relativity, and in the second case, we are technically free, but in fact have no choice about what we actually do.
But what if the constraints placed *are* one's desires? If the mind is looked at as a biological system, then it is as subject to material cause and effect as any other physical system. The decision made by that mind in any given moment could not, then, be any other decision based upon both the structure of that physical system and the inputs (needs, stimuli, etc.) received. In order to say that freedom to do whatever is physically possible exists, we have to accept that non-physical stimuli can affect physical systems, a conclusion for which there exists no evidence.
That doesn't mean that we aren't free in the sense that we can do what we want or what we decide. We just aren't as independent of our environment as we'd like to believe.
Right. But the questions is: if mental processes are nothing more than a biological system subject to material cause-and-effect, then are our choices free or determined?
Can they not be both? If not, then how would "free" be defined if actions which are pursued according to one's desires for them are not necessarily free? Does free necessarily mean that a component of the causation for the decision or action lies outside the interactions of matter and energy in the physical system?
Post a Comment